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Abstract. Data from three bargaining games—the Dictator Game, the Ultimatum
Game, and the Third-Party Punishment Game—played in 15 societies are presented.
The societies range from US undergraduates to Amazonian, Arctic, and African
hunter-gatherers. Behaviour within the games varies markedly across societies. The
paper investigates whether this behavioural diversity can be explained solely by
variations in inequality aversion. Combining a single parameter utility function with
the notion of subgame perfection generates a number of testable predictions. While
most of these are supported, there are some telling divergences between theory and
data: uncertainty and preferences relating to acts of vengeance may have inﬂuenced
play in the Ultimatum and Third-Party Punishment Games; and a few subjects
used the games as an opportunity to engage in costly signalling.
1. Introduction
In 2001, Henrich et. al. introduced data from Ultimatum Games (UGs) conducted in 15
variably remote societies.
1 The data displayed a diversity not seen in UG data before. The
societies varied signiﬁcantly in terms of both their mean oﬀers and their apparent rejection
strategies. The study was presented in greater detail and further analysed in an edited volume
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(Henrich et. al., 2004) and in Henrich et. al. (2005) and generated considerable debate (some
of which is documented in the same issue of Behavioral and Brain Sciences in 2005). Much
of the debate focused on the documented methodological variations across societies and the
diﬃculties in establishing precisely what was driving the observed variations in oﬀers owing
to the nature of the UG game and the rareness of rejections in the data. So, between 2001 and
2005 several researchers from the original project and several new recruits returned to the
ﬁeld with an improved experimental design: the UG was rerun, applying the strategy method
to the responding players; a simple Dictator Game (DG) was conducted; and a simpliﬁed
version of the Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) Third-Party Punishment Game (TPG) was also
included in the design, with the strategy method applied to the third party. In addition,
experimental protocols were tightened to improve comparability across societies and ensure
that, in every society, the experimental subjects were representative of, i.e. randomly drawn
from, the adult population. The outcome is a very rich dataset that, like its predecessor,
shows wide variations in behaviour across societies. However, unlike its predecessor, this new
dataset can support tests of hypotheses relating to correlations between diﬀerent types of
behaviour across societies. Thus, Henrich et. al. (2006) were able to show that the data are
consistent with the co-evolution of altruism and third-party punishment. The application
of the strategy method and the inclusion of three games in the experimental design also
facilitates extensive testing of the consistency in cross-society behavioural variations across
diﬀerent games and roles. This paper, having presented the new data in some detail, exploits
this aspect of the dataset to the full. It investigates whether cross-society variations in
observed behaviour in each of the ﬁve active roles in the games can be explained by diﬀerences
in a single dimension, namely a preference for equality or an aversion to inequality.
Like Henrich et. al. (2004, 2005), this paper builds on the work of Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-
Fujiwara, and Zamir (1991), in that it exploits cross-society variations in an analysis of UG
oﬀers. However, it departs from this earlier work in two important respects. First, instead
of asking whether, given observed rejection proﬁles, oﬀering behaviour in each society is
consistent with selﬁsh money maximisation, it builds on the notion that whatever preference
is manifest in rejecting behaviour should also be manifest in oﬀering behaviour. If the subject
samples assigned to each role in each society are independent random draws from the same
population, such a match should be evident in the data. However, given the asymmetry
in the decisions facing the subjects in the two roles, the match can be identiﬁed only if
the appropriate model of preferences and strategic interactions is applied and, turning this
around, the identiﬁcation of a match can be taken as evidence that the model applied is
correct. Second, the analysis is extended to the DG and TPG as well. Indeed, the DG, the
simplest of the three games, is used as the basis for comparison throughout.
In its acknowledgement that behaviour can be both rational and consistent with unselﬁsh
preferences, the paper builds on the work of Andreoni and Miller (2002). In its use of cross-
role behavioural comparisons as a method for establishing whether behaviour is consistent3
with a given utility function, the paper builds on the work of Andreoni, Castillo, and Petrie
(2003). They conducted both the standard UG, applying the strategy method to the re-
sponder, and a modiﬁed UG in which responders could, rather than rejecting, shrink both
their own and the proposer’s payoﬀs proportionally. However, while they could rely solely on
within-subject comparisons, here both within-subject and within-society comparisons need
to be exploited. This is because, while all the subjects in Andreoni, Castillo, and Petrie
(2003) played as both proposers and responders before knowing which role had actually
been assigned to them, many of the subjects in the cross-society study played in only one
role. Fortunately, the cross-society variations in behaviour within the dataset are suﬃcient
to support a society-level analysis.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, after this introduction, the experimental design
and key elements of the protocol are described. Then, in Section 3, the resulting data are
presented in summary and graphical form. This descriptive analysis brings to the fore not
only the behavioural diversity across the ﬁfteen societies selected for the study but also a
number of regularities: for example, society mean DG oﬀers vary from 26 to 47 percent of
the stake; and in several societies “U-shaped” rejection strategies are observed in the UG.
In Section 4, these regularities guide the choice of a particular utility function that captures
the notion of inequality aversion as a basis for the theory. In Section 5, the utility function is
combined with the notion of subgame perfection to generate ﬁve testable predictions about
how people play the DG, UG, and TPG.
In Section 6, each of these predictions is examined and tested. In general, the data provide
strong support for the model. Within the context of the DG, UG, and TPG at least, inequal-
ity aversion appears to be the principle factor motivating individuals’ decisions. Variations
in behaviour across societies and across individuals within societies appear to be driven by
diﬀerences in the value placed upon equality. However, despite the model’s overall success, it
fails in a few interesting regards: there is evidence that uncertainty and another preference,
possibly related to acts of vengeance, aﬀect behaviour and outcomes in the UG and TPG;
and a few experimental subjects appear to have treated the games as a signalling opportunity
within a meta-game. These failures are discussed in Section 7. Section 8 concludes.
2. Experimental Design
2.1. The Games. In the Dictator Game (DG), two players, Player 1 and Player 2, were
endowed with a sum of money (the stake). Player 1 divided the money between the players.
Player 2 was a passive recipient. Oﬀers were restricted to 10 percent increments of the stake
and play was anonymous and one shot.
In the Ultimatum Game (UG), two players, Player 1 and Player 2, were endowed with a sum
of money (the stake). Player 1 proposed a division of the stake to Player 2. Player 2, before
hearing the actual amount oﬀered by Player 1, decided whether to accept or reject each of4
the possible oﬀers. Oﬀers again were restricted to 10 percent increments of the stake, so
Player 2s made eleven accept/reject decisions and these decisions were binding. If Player 2
speciﬁed that the amount of the actual oﬀer would be accepted, then this was the amount
they received and Player 1 received the remainder. If Player 2 speciﬁed “reject” for the
amount of the actual oﬀer, both players received zero. Play was anonymous and one shot.
In the Third-Party Punishment Game (TPG), two players, Player 1 and Player 2, were
endowed with a sum of money (the stake), and a third player, Player 3, was endowed with
one half of this amount. Player 1 proposed a division of the stake between the ﬁrst two
players. Player 2 was a passive recipient. Player 3, before hearing the actual amount oﬀered
by Player 1 to Player 2, decided whether to pay to have Player 1 ﬁned or not in the case
of each of the possible oﬀers Player 1 could have made. Oﬀers again were restricted to 10
percent increments of the stake, so Player 3s made eleven do/don’t pay-to-ﬁne decisions and
these decisions were binding. If Player 3 chose to pay to have Player 1 ﬁned in the case of
the actual oﬀer, Player 3 paid 20 percent of his initial endowment (10 percent of the stake)
and Player 1 was ﬁned 30 percent of the stake. Play was anonymous and one shot.
Table 1. Experimental Sites
Site Country Environs Economic Base Residence
Hadza Tanzania Savanna/woodlands Foraging Nomadic
Tsimane Bolivia Tropical forest Horticulture/foraging Semi-nomadic
Emory students US Temperate forest/urban Students Temporary Res.
Gusii Kenya Fertile high plains Mixed farming/waged work Sedentary
Maragoli Kenya Fertile plains Subsistence farming Sedentary
Yasawa Fiji Coastal tropical island Horticulture/marine foraging Sedentary
Shuar Ecuador Tropical forest Horticulture/foraging Sedentary
Isanga village Tanzania Mountainous forest Mixed farming/waged work Sedentary
Dolgan/Ngagasan Russian Fed. Tundra/taiga Hunting/ﬁshing/waged work Semi-sedentary
Samburu Kenya Semi-arid savanna Pastoralism Semi-nomadic
Sursurunga PNG Coastal tropical island Horticulture Sedentary
Au PNG Mountainous tropical forest Horticulture/foraging Sedentary
Accra city Ghana Urban, high density Waged worker Sedentary
Sanquianga Colombia Mangrove forest Commercial ﬁshing Sedentary
Rural Missouri US Prairie Mixed farming/waged work Sedentary
2.2. The Societies and Subjects. The principle aim of this program of research was not
to provide a representative view of but to explore the diversity in notions of fairness across
human societies.
2 This aim is reﬂected in the diversity of the ﬁfteen societies chosen for
the study. They range from US undergraduates, through waged workers in urban Ghana,
horticulturalists and waged workers in the US, Kenya, and Tanzania, subsistence and small
scale farmers in Kenya and Papua New Guinea, horticulturalists who also forage in Bolivia,
Ecuador, Fiji, and Papua New Guinea, hunters and ﬁsher-folk in Colombia and Siberia,
and foragers in Tanzania. The names of the societies and a few of their characteristics are
reported in Table 1. Within each society, invited subjects were randomly selected from the
adult population and, among those invited, non-attendance was rare. Thus, the samples are
highly representative of the communities from which they are drawn.
2F o rm o r ea b o u tt h ea i m so ft h ep r o j e c t ,s e ehttp://www.hss.caltech.edu/roots-of-sociality.5
2.3. Protocol. In every society the stake was set close to one day’s wage in the local econ-
omy, but at a value that rendered it equivalent to (multiples of) ten coins or notes in the
local currency. Thus, the subjects could be taught and play the games using real coins or
notes. Players were paid a show-up fee roughly equal to 20 percent of one day’s wage in the
local economy. Show-up fees and winnings from the games were paid in private and in cash
at the end of each session.
The goal was to generate 30 data points relating to each role in each society. For each
decision (oﬀer or strategy) to have been made by a diﬀerent individual would have required
150 subjects per society and having the passive roles ﬁlled by ﬁrst-time subjects every time
would have required a further 60 subjects per society. Some of the communities were not
large enough to provide that many adult subjects. So, some doubling up of roles was built
into the original design. Speciﬁcally, two types of experimental session were designed. In
one, subjects ﬁrst played the DG and then went on to play the UG. Player 1s in the DG
became Player 1s in the UG and the passive Player 2s in the DG became Player 2s in the
UG and decided upon their acceptance/rejection strategies before being told what they had
received in the DG.
3 In the other type of experimental session, subjects played the TPG.
Table 2. Sample Sizes for Active Player Roles
Dictator Ultimatum Third-Party
Game Game Pun. Game
Role 1 Role 1 Role 2 Role 1 Role 3
Hadza 31 31 31 27 27
T s i m a n e 3 8 3 63 32 72 3
E m o r y 1 9 1 91 92 22 0
G u s i i 2 5 2 52 53 03 0
Maragoli 25 25 25 30 30
Yasawa 35 34 34 30 29
Shuar 21 21 20 15 17
Isanga 30 30 30 20 20
Dolgan/Nganasan 30 30 29
S a m b u r u 3 1 3 13 13 03 0
Sursurunga 30 30 29 32 32
Au 30 30 30 30 30
A c c r a 3 0 3 03 03 93 9
Sanquianga 30 30 30 32 32
Rural Missouri 15 26 28
Full sample 420 428 424 364 359
In each society, the DG and UG sessions were completed ﬁrst. Then, in several of the
societies it was necessary to re-use subjects from these sessions in the passive Player 2 role
in the TPG sessions.
4 Among the Hadza, Yasawa, and Shuar it was also necessary to re-use
3In Rural Missouri the DG and UG were played in separate sessions using diﬀerent subjects. This is because
the sessions in Rural Missouri were conducted early, in order that the English scripts could be piloted. It
was only after this pilot, during a workshop attended by all the researchers, that it was realised that society
size would be a constraint in many cases.
4Re-used subjects never knew they would be attending a second session when assuming their ﬁrst active role.6
subjects from the DG and UG sessions in active roles in the TPG sessions. The resulting
sample sizes relating to each of the active roles in each of the sites is reported in Table 2.
In all sessions the games were presented orally to the subjects as a group using visual aids
and real money. Then, one by one, the subjects were called to private meetings with the
researcher and in most cases a research assistant ﬂuent in the local language.
5 At these
meetings they were talked through the game once more using visual aids and real money,
tested to ensure they understood, invited to ask questions, told their randomly assigned role,
and invited to make their decision. UG Player 2s and TPG Player 3s, having been told their
role, were shown the blank side of a slip of paper, on the reverse of which had been written
their Player 1’s oﬀer. This slip of paper was placed face down on the table in front of them
to remind them that Player 1’s decision had already been made and could not be inﬂuenced.
Table 3. Session Sizes
Dictator and Third-Party
Ultimatum Games Pun. Game
Mean Min. Max. Mean Min. Max.
Hadza 20.32 8 30 30.06 17 39
Tsimane 73.00 73 73 56.01 12 63
Emory 18.62 17 20 64.00 64 64
Gusii 50.00 50 50 90.00 90 90
Maragoli 26.00 20 30 90.00 90 90
Yasawa 17.89 14 20 29.67 29 30
Shuar 30.76 6 35 48.00 48 48
Isanga 20.00 20 20 20.10 18 21
Dolgan/Nganasan 19.68 19 20
Samburu 62.00 62 62 89.00 89 89
Sursurunga 30.00 30 30 49.69 39 57
Au 60.00 60 60 90.00 90 90
Accra 20.00 20 20 25.00 15 33
Sanquianga 20.00 20 20 33.75 24 42
Rural Missouri (DG) 28.00 28 28
Rural Missouri (UG) 27.00 27 27
Full Sample 34.11 54.28
Note. Means weighted by numbers of subjects.
Both the group training sessions and the one-on-one meetings were fully scripted in English
using neutral language. The scripts were translated into each of the local languages and then
back translated by independent third parties so that they could be checked for consistency
and to ensure that wordings remained as neutral as possible throughout.
The subjects knew that roles and playing partners were to be randomly assigned and, where
appropriate, that they were to be randomly re-partnered between the DG and UG. Subjects
were called to their one-on-one meetings in a near random order: it could not be perfectly
random as Player 2s and 3s could be met only after their Player 1s had made their oﬀers.
5Research assistants who were members of the society turned away when subjects made their decisions.7
Subjects were asked not to talk to one another about the experiment during the sessions and
monitors were assigned to ensure that no-one violated this rule. Subjects who were waiting
to play a game were sat separately from subjects who had already played.
For practical reasons, session sizes varied. In some small village societies, running one large
DG and UG session involving 60 subjects and one large TPG session involving 90 subjects
was the only way to prevent subject contamination. However, such sessions took a very
long time to run. So, in societies made up of several geographical clusters between which
contamination was unlikely and transportation was an issue, several smaller sessions were
run. Mean, minimum, and maximum session sizes for each society are reported in Table 3.
All participants knew everything about the games they were asked to play, except who
was matched with whom. The scripts speciﬁed that players were matched with (an)other
person(s) from their village, workplace, or town, but made it clear no-one would ever know
who was matched with whom. The scripts also made it clear that the games were one shot.
3. Experimental Data
The data generated by the experimental sessions in each society are presented in Figures 1,
2, and 3 and in summary form in Table 4. Figure 1 presents histograms of the DG and
UG oﬀers in each society, while the ﬁrst two columns of Table 4 present the corresponding
mean DG and UG oﬀers. Both the histograms and the rows in the table have been ordered
with reference to the mean DG oﬀer in each society. The histograms and table reveal both
considerable diversity and some marked patterns in the data. First, note the wide variation
in mean oﬀers across societies. The mean DG oﬀer varies from 0.26 of the stake among
the Hadza and the Tsimane to 0.47 among the Sanquianga and the Rural Missourians; the
mean UG oﬀer varies from 0.25 among the Maragoli to 0.51 among the Sursurunga. Second,
across all societies both DG and UG oﬀers above 0.5 of the stake are rare. So, as the mean
DG oﬀer rises, the DG oﬀers tend to become increasingly concentrated at and around 0.5.
Second, the distributions in DG and UG oﬀers are very similar within each society with the
latter tending to be only marginally to the right of the former. Third, in societies with lower
mean DG oﬀers, the distribution of DG oﬀers tends to have greater weight at the left-hand
end relative to the distribution of UG oﬀers. Finally, two societies stand out: the Gusii with
particularly pronounced modes at 0.3 in the DG and 0.4 in the UG; and the Maragoli who
made signiﬁcantly lower oﬀers in the UG.
Figure 2 presents histograms of UG oﬀers in each society overlaid by the mean UG re-
jection/acceptance strategies.
6 The third column of Table 4 presents the mean minimum
acceptable oﬀer (the mean of the lowest oﬀer that each Player 2 was willing to accept) in
each society. The fourth column presents the mean maximum acceptable oﬀer (the mean of
the highest oﬀer that each Player 2 was willing to accept) in each society. The ordering of the
6The proportion of Player 2s accepting any given oﬀer can be read from the right-hand vertical axis.8
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Table 4. Mean Oﬀers, Rejection, and Fining Strategies
Dictator Ultimatum Third-Party
Game Game Pun. Game
Mean Oﬀer Mean Oﬀer Min. AO Max. AO Mean Oﬀer Min. UO
Hadza 0.26 0.26 0.25 1.00 0.26 0.09
(0.25) (0.17) (0.26) (0.00) (0.19) (0.17)
Tsimane 0.26 0.27 0.07 1.00 0.20 0.04
(0.15) (0.11) (0.05) (0.00) (0.13) (0.08)
Emory 0.32 0.41 0.21 1.00 0.27 0.16
(0.24) (0.14) (0.14) (0.00) (0.27) (0.20)
Gusii 0.33 0.40 0.38 1.00 0.36 0.41
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.00) (0.09) (0.05)
Maragoli 0.35 0.25 0.30 1.00 0.34 0.40
(0.17) (0.16) (0.08) (0.00) (0.21) (0.19)
Yasawa 0.35 0.40 0.06 0.95 0.27 0.07
(0.18) (0.17) (0.13) (0.13) (0.20) (0.15)
Shuar 0.35 0.37 0.07 0.98 0.37 0.23
(0.19) (0.17) (0.14) (0.11) (0.18) (0.25)
Isanga 0.36 0.38 0.07 0.98 0.33 0.31
(0.18) (0.13) (0.10) (0.09) (0.17) (0.16)
Dolgan/Nganasan 0.37 0.43 0.15 0.98
(0.21) (0.16) (0.20) (0.09)
Samburu 0.40 0.35 0.06 0.97 0.31 0.22
(0.23) (0.19) (0.12) (0.05) (0.18) (0.16)
Sursurunga 0.41 0.51 0.37 0.83 0.37 0.10
(0.19) (0.16) (0.32) (0.27) (0.19) (0.13)
Au 0.41 0.44 0.20 0.93 0.33 0.31
(0.20) (0.15) (0.21) (0.14) (0.23) (0.20)
Accra 0.42 0.44 0.13 0.88 0.28 0.26
(0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18)
Sanquianga 0.47 0.48 0.12 0.88 0.43 0.25
(0.16) (0.10) (0.18) (0.16) (0.16) (0.22)
Rural Missouri 0.47 0.48 0.28
(0.10) (0.10) (0.20)
Full sample 0.37 0.39 0.18 0.95 0.32 0.22
(0.19) (0.16) (0.20) (0.13) (0.19) (0.20)
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. An agnostic and literal approach is used to identify each
subject’s UG Min. and Max. AO and TPG Min. UO. So, UG Min. AOs and TPG Min. UOs
can be greater than 0.5, UG Max. AOs can be less than 0.5, apparently inconsistent strategies
are coded, and only two strategies, in which all oﬀers are ﬁned, are excluded from the analysis.
graphs is identical to that in Figure 1—it relates to mean DG oﬀers. Here, once again, there
is considerable variation in behaviour across societies. In some, such as the Yasawa, Shuar,
and Samburu, rejections are rare, while in others, such as the Gusii and the Maragoli, there
is almost unanimous rejection of low oﬀers. The most striking feature of this ﬁgure, however,
is that in some societies several Player 2s chose to reject not only low but also high oﬀers.
The mean maximum acceptable oﬀer is 1.0 in only ﬁve societies and is lowest, at 0.83, among
the Sursurunga. Further, note that the rejections of high oﬀers are concentrated towards the
bottom of the ﬁgure, i.e., in the societies where mean DG oﬀers are relatively high.
7 Finally,
except among the Sursurunga and the Hadza, oﬀers of 0.5 were never rejected.
7The absence of the right-hand side of the mean acceptance/rejection strategy in the graph for Rural Missouri
is, again, owing to the fact that this site acted as a pilot for the scripts and protocols, and it was only in the
subsequent research team workshop that the enumeration of the full strategy was decided upon.12
Figure 3 presents histograms of TPG oﬀers in each society overlaid by the mean TPG
do/don’t pay-to-ﬁne strategies.
8 The ﬁfth column of Table 4 presents the mean TPG oﬀers
for each society and the sixth column presents the mean minimum unﬁned oﬀer (the mean of
lowest oﬀers that each Player 3 chose not to pay to have ﬁned) in each society. The graphs are
ordered identically to those in Figure 1 (by mean DG oﬀers). Once again, behaviour varies
markedly across societies. The Hadza, Tsimane, and Yasawa rarely ﬁne, while in most of
the other societies the ﬁning of low oﬀers is commonplace. Also, the oﬀer distributions tend
to be to the left of the corresponding distributions of DG oﬀers. Finally, in contrast to the
UG acceptance/rejection strategies, the do/don’t ﬁne strategies tend to be monotonic, with
the few instances where oﬀers greater than 0.5 attracted a ﬁne appearing as inconsistencies.
4. Modelling Inequality Aversion
That many of the observed oﬀers are greater than zero is consistent with the existence of
unconditional altruism. However, unconditional altruism cannot explain rejections or ﬁnes.
9
The rejection of low oﬀers could be viewed as evidence of a type of negative reciprocity; but
the rejection of high oﬀers cannot, and neither can the ﬁning of low oﬀers by third parties.
10
One motivation that can explain all these features is inequality aversion; but can variations in
this single motivation across societies and individuals explain all the behavioural variations in
the data? To address this question, a simple model based on a well-behaved utility function
that exhibits inequality aversion is developed. The approach has the “separability” property
discussed by Camerer (2003, p. 111) in that the apparatus of (subgame-perfect) equilibrium
is left intact; preferences alone depart from the standard textbook treatment of game theory.
One way to model inequality aversion would be to follow the work of Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
and assume that players’ utilities are (linearly) increasing in the monetary amount they
receive, but (linearly) decreasing in the absolute monetary diﬀerence between the amount
they receive and the amount received by other players.
11 However, as they stated, and
Camerer (2003, Ch. 2) noted, the optimal oﬀer in a DG when inequality aversion is piecewise
linear has an extreme property: oﬀers should be either ﬁfty-ﬁfty or zero, in their own words
“a prediction that is clearly refuted by the data” (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, p. 848).
12 They
observed that “a utility function that is concave in the amount of advantageous inequality
[would generate] optimal oﬀers that are in the interior of [0,0.5]” (ibid.). This is precisely the
8The proportion of Player 3s choosing not to ﬁne a given oﬀer can be read from the right-hand vertical axis.
9For example, Andreoni and Miller (2002) estimated a CES utility function in which the monetary payoﬀ
received by another enters: rejection in the UG and ﬁning in the TPG cannot be captured by this approach.
10Following in the spirit of the “fairness equilibrium” of Rabin (1993), Falk and Fischbacher (2006) introduced
the notion of a “reciprocity equilibrium”. The prediction in the DG is identical to the one here (see Lemma 1,
with α = ρ1 × ε1 in their notation). However, reciprocity equilibrium in the UG always involves acceptance
of oﬀers greater than 50% (Prop. 1, pp. 303–304, op. cit.). The “sequential reciprocity equilibrium” of
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) has the same feature. See Camerer (2003) for a detailed discussion.
11Charness and Rabin (2002) took a similar approach with fewer restrictions on the signs of the parameters.
12Such a prediction is clearly refuted by the data here as well, as Figure 1 illustrates.13
approach taken here. Moreover, using such a utility function admits a “U-shaped” rejection
function in the UG whereby very high oﬀers as well as very low oﬀers may be optimally
rejected—a key feature apparent from Figure 2.
A particularly simple one-parameter speciﬁcation is proposed here: players’ utilities are
assumed to be increasing in the monetary amount received, but decreasing in the empirical
variance of the monetary amounts received by the set of all players. Player i receives utility










where xj is the monetary payoﬀ received by Player j, n is the number of players in the
game, and ¯ x ≡ 1
n
n
j=1 xj is the mean monetary payoﬀ. α ≥ 0 is a parameter measuring the
degree of inequality aversion. If α = 0 the players do not care about inequality: utilities and
monetary payoﬀs coincide. As α →∞ , players ﬁnd inequality more and more distasteful.
The speciﬁcation of (1) for the UG can be viewed as an appropriately parameterised version of
the quadratic utility function used by Andreoni, Castillo, and Petrie (2005). They estimated
such functions for various UGs; and although they did not extend the approach to n-player
games, (1) is consistent with a natural generalisation of their approach to larger games.








with the second argument assumed to be 1
n whenever
n
j=1 xj = 0. Fixing the second
argument, the function vi is increasing in xi; ﬁxing the ﬁrst argument, vi is maximised when
the second is 1
n. For the UG, the speciﬁcation of (1) can be rewritten in this form. However,
the TPG presents a problem for the utility function in (2). In particular, the third party




respectively. A ﬁne induces a monetary cost to the ﬁner (strictly reducing the ﬁrst argument)
and (almost always) a change to the latter, thus necessarily reducing v3.H o w e v e r ,b o t ht h e
Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) data and the data above indicate that some oﬀers are ﬁned.
5. Equilibrium and Five Predictions
This section uses the utility function in (1) to generate predictions about play in the three
games described above. First, the subgame-perfect equilibria of the DG (Section 5.1), the
UG (Section 5.2), and the TPG (Section 5.3) are characterised under the assumption that
players are inequality averse. Then, Section 5.4 sets out ﬁve testable predictions, one relating
to behaviours and outcomes that should not be observed, and four focusing on how behaviour
in each of the four active roles in the UG and TPG relates to behaviour in the DG.14
5.1. The Dictator Game. Deﬁne the monetary payoﬀs to Player 1 and 2 respectively as
(x1,x 2). From (1), inequality-averse players receive utility














Normalising the size of the stake to 1 (the same is done for each of the three games), the
equilibrium oﬀer is found simply by substituting x1 =1− x2 and maximising Player 1’s
payoﬀ u1 with respect to the oﬀer (x2):







= −1+α(1 − 2x2).
This yields an immediate characterisation of the equilibrium oﬀer.








2α if α ≥ 1,
0 if α<1.
The equilibrium oﬀer is increasing in α: the more inequality averse the players, the higher
the fraction of the surplus Player 2 receives. Player 1 never gives more than half: x∗
DG < 1
2.
5.2. The Ultimatum Game. For diﬀerent values of α the (subgame-perfect) equilibrium
in the UG has diﬀerent properties. Working backwards, Player 2 accepts any oﬀer resulting
in u2 ≥ 0 (since rejecting the oﬀer always results in a zero payoﬀ). Hence, using (3), if the




































For α>4 note that xmax < 1. The equilibrium has a “U-shaped” rejection function for
Player 2: very high and very low oﬀers are rejected. As Lemma 2 will demonstrate, however,
Player 2’s strategy is never binding for Player 1’s oﬀer for such high values of α: given Player
1’s inequality aversion, the optimal oﬀer to Player 2 satisﬁes xmin <x ∗
UG <x max.13












Player 2 accepts if xUG ∈ [xmin,x max] and rejects otherwise. In equilibrium, the oﬀer is
always accepted (x∗
UG ∈ [xmin,x max]) and increasing in α. Player 2’s rejection function is
“U-shaped” for α>4. When α ≥ 3
2 note that x∗
UG = x∗
DG; and both x∗
UG ≥ 1
6 and xmin ≥ 1
6.
13This may explain why in Henrich et. al. (2004; 2005) mean oﬀers tend to exceed income-maximising oﬀers.15
5.3. The Third-Party Punishment Game. Recall that, if Player 3 chooses to ﬁne Player
1 this costs Player 3 c = 1
10 and Player 1 p = 3
10. Utilities (now with n =3 )a r ea sg i v e ni n
(1). Player 3 is originally endowed with a surplus of x3 = 1
2. To compute the subgame-perfect
equilibrium, ﬁrst consider Player 3’s choice. ¯ x = 1




if Player 3 ﬁnes Player 1. If Player 1 gives Player 2 an amount xTPG, and substituting in for

































This reduces to give a minimum unﬁned oﬀer of
x










any xTPG <x ﬁne results in a ﬁne from Player 3. Following some straightforward (although
cumbersome) algebra it is then possible to characterise the equilibrium for this game.












Player 3 ﬁnes if and only if xTPG <x ﬁne. In equilibrium, Player 3 never ﬁnes (x∗
TPG ≥ xﬁne)
and x∗
TPG is increasing in α.F o rα<45
38 Player 3 sets xﬁne =0and Player 1 gives x∗
TPG =0 .
5.4. Theoretical Predictions. The ﬁrst prediction is a very straightforward corollary to
Lemmas 1-3, and concerns some general features of the equilibria in the three games.
Prediction 1. No oﬀer should exceed 1






2 should never be rejected in the Ultimatum Game: xmin < 1
2 <x max. Oﬀers
weakly greater than 1
2 should never be ﬁned in the Third-Party Punishment Game: xﬁne < 1
2.
Equilibrium oﬀers are never rejected and never ﬁned: x∗
UG ∈ [xmin,x max] and x∗
TPG ≥ xﬁne.
The remaining four predictions describe how behaviours should be related across games and
roles, assuming that they are driven by the same underlying utility function and value of α.
Prediction 2. Figure 4 shows how xmin and xmax vary with x∗
DG.F o r x∗
DG > 0, xmin is
increasing and convex. x∗
DG = xmin at 1
6 (shown by the dotted line in the left-hand panel) and
at 0 and 1




DG =0 . xmax is weakly decreasing and concave
in x∗
DG. xmax =1for all values of x∗
DG ≤ 3
8 (shown by the dotted line in the right-hand panel);
for all values of x∗
DG > 3
8, the rejection function in the Ultimatum Game is “U-shaped”.
Prediction 3. Figure 5 illustrates how x∗
UG varies with x∗
DG.F o rx∗
DG ≤ 1
6 (the short dotted
line), x∗




2 is consistent with x∗




the long dotted line, at 3
8, indicates the point where rejections become “U-shaped”; Ultimatum
Game oﬀers should be (weakly) larger than Dictator Game oﬀers, x∗
UG ≥ x∗
DG.16
Figure 4. Dictator Oﬀers vs. Ultimatum Rejection Strategies
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Figure 5. Dictator vs. Ultimatum Oﬀers
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Prediction 4. The left-hand panel in Figure 6 illustrates how xﬁne varies with x∗
DG. When
oﬀers in the Dictator Game are low, x∗
DG ≤ 7
90, Player 3 should not ﬁne at all: xﬁne =0 .
The minimum oﬀer required to avoid a ﬁne then increases linearly with x∗
DG, with slope 1.
Prediction 5. The right-hand panel in Figure 6 illustrates how x∗
TPG varies with x∗
DG. The
equilibrium oﬀer is constrained (x∗
TPG = xﬁne) for x∗
DG ≤ 31
90, then increases linearly with
slope 3
2 until 1




Figure 6. Dictator Oﬀers vs. Third-Party Punishment Game
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6. Testing the Predictions
6.1. High Oﬀers, Rejections, and Fines. The proportion of oﬀers that violate Predic-
tion 1 by exceeding 0.5 in each game and society is reported in Table 5. As noted above,
oﬀers exceeding 0.5 are rare. They represent 10 percent of the sample of DG oﬀers and 7
percent of the samples of UG and TPG oﬀers. However, given the eﬀorts made to both
maximise and test subject understanding prior to eliciting their decisions, it would be in-
appropriate to ascribe these oﬀers to error, especially among the Sursurunga, 33 percent of
whom made oﬀers greater than 0.5 in the UG, and the Maragoli, 20 percent of whom made
oﬀers greater than 0.5 in the TPG.
Table 5. High Oﬀers
Dictator Game Ultimatum Game Third-Party Pun. Game
Prop. Oﬀers > 0.5P r o p . O ﬀ e r s > 0.5P r o p . O ﬀ e r s > 0.5
Hadza 10% 3% 0%
Tsimane 0% 0% 0%
Emory 11% 11% 9%
Gusii 0% 0% 0%
Maragoli 16% 0% 20%
Yasawa 6% 6% 0%
Shuar 10% 5% 13%
Isanga 7% 0% 5%
Dolgan/Nganasan 7% 7%
Samburu 19% 10% 7%
Sursurunga 17% 33% 13%
Au 17% 13% 7%
Accra 7% 7% 3%
Sanquianga 17% 7% 13%
Rural Missouri 0% 4%
Full Sample 10% 7% 7%18
Table 6. Incidence of Rejection and Fining
Ultimatum Game Third-Party Pun. Game
Proportion Incidence Proportion Incidence
Rejecting 0.5 of Rejection Fining ≥ 0.5 of Fining
Hadza 16% 35% 4% 17%
Tsimane 0% 0.3% 0% 6%
Emory 0% 12% 0% 27%
Gusii 0% 15% 0% 51%
Maragoli 0% 51% 23% 52%
Yasawa 0% 7% 14% 16%
Shuar 0% 6% 12% 30%
Isanga 0% 3% 0% 41%
Dolgan/Nganasan 0% 11%
Samburu 0% 5% 7% 26%
Sursurunga 28% 41% 13% 11%
Au 0% 15% 0% 46%
Accra 0% 8% 5% 41%
Sanquianga 0% 4% 3% 21%
Rural Missouri 0% 8%
Full sample 3% 14% 6% 30%
Note. “Incidence of rejection” is the proportion of all possible pairings of
oﬀers and rejection strategies within sites leading to a rejection in the UG;
“incidence of ﬁning” is the proportion of all possible pairings of oﬀers and
ﬁning strategies within sites leading to a ﬁne in the TPG.
The ﬁrst column in Table 6 reports the proportion of Player 2s in the UG rejecting oﬀers of
0.5 in each of the societies and across all societies. Such rejections occur in only two societies:
the Hadza and the Sursurunga. Overall, only 3 percent of UG Player 2s reject oﬀers of 0.5.
The third column in Table 6 reports the proportion of Player 3s in the TPG who ﬁne oﬀers
of 0.5 and above in each of the societies and across all societies. In general, the ﬁning of high
oﬀers is rare; only 6 percent of TPG Player 3s displayed such behaviour. However, among
the Maragoli, 23 percent ﬁned oﬀers of 0.5 and a few ﬁned oﬀers of 0.6.
The last part of Prediction 1 is tested by examining the incidence of rejections in the UG and
ﬁnes in the TPG across the entire subject sample and within each society one at a time. In
the experiments, each subject was randomly matched with one other from their own society
in the UG and two others in the TPG. One method for testing this prediction would be to
look at the incidence of actual rejections and ﬁnes within these random matches. However,
the prediction can be tested with greater accuracy if, instead of restricting the analysis to
actual subject matches, all the possible matches are analysed—Player 1 to Player 2 in the
UG and Player 1 to Player 3 in the TPG—within each society. The results of this exercise
are reported in the second and fourth columns of Table 6.
Across all societies, the rejection incidence in the UG is 14 percent. However, there is marked
variation in this proportion across societies. Among the Hadza, Maragoli, and Sursurunga,
the incidence of rejection is 35, 51, and 41 percent respectively. Figure 2 indicates that the19
high incidence of rejection among the Maragoli results from many low oﬀers being made and
rejected. Among the Sursurunga the high incidence results from the rejection of oﬀers of 0.5.
Finally, among the Hadza, the high incidence results from a mixture of these two causes. If
these three societies are excluded from the analysis, the overall rejection rate is 7 percent.
Compared to rejections, ﬁnes are commonplace. Across all societies, the ﬁning incidence is
30 percent. It is greatest among the Gusii and Maragoli at 51 and 52 percent respectively,
but is less than 15 percent in only two societies: the Tsimane and Sursurunga.
6.2. DG Oﬀers and UG Rejection Strategies. DG Player 1s never assumed the role of
UG Player 2s, so Prediction 2 can be investigated only at the society level.
14 Superimposing
society mean minimum and maximum acceptable oﬀers plotted against society mean DG
oﬀers on the graphs relating to Prediction 2 above returns Figure 7.
Figure 7. Predictions versus Data for Rejections in the Ultimatum Game
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There is no apparent relationship between society mean DG oﬀers and UG minimum ac-
ceptable oﬀers; most of the data points are markedly below and to the right of the predicted
relationship. However, treating the predicted relationship as a null hypothesis, bootstrap
tests involving 1,000 random draws from the distributions of the estimated mean DG oﬀer
and mean UG minimum acceptable oﬀer for each society indicate that the predicted rela-
tionship can be rejected for only three societies: the point for the Gusii is signiﬁcantly (1
percent level) above; the points for the Isanga and the Tsimane are signiﬁcantly (10 and 5
percent level respectively) below.
14To establish that there is suﬃcient cross-society variation in behaviour to support such an analysis, three
subject-level regressions taking DG oﬀers, UG minimum acceptable oﬀers, and UG maximum acceptable
oﬀers as their respective dependent variables and a full set of society indicators as their explanatory variables
were conducted. All three regressions were highly signiﬁcant, indicating that a society-level analysis will be
informative. The regressions are reported in Table 7.20
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In stark contrast, the relationship of mean DG oﬀers to UG maximum acceptable oﬀers
is well deﬁned, negative, signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level according to a na¨ ıve pairwise
correlation across means, and in strong accordance with Prediction 2. Here, according to
bootstrap tests of the form described above, the predicted relationship cannot be rejected
for any society.
6.3. DG and UG Oﬀers. If the society mean UG oﬀers are plotted against society mean
DG oﬀers and the resulting scatter superimposed on the graph relating to Prediction 3 above,
Figure 8 is returned.15 The relationship between society mean DG and UG oﬀers is positive,
signiﬁcant at the 0.1 percent level, and in accordance with Prediction 3. According to a
bootstrap test of the form described above, the predicted relationship cannot be rejected for
any society. Finally, an OLS regression of society mean UG oﬀers on society mean DG oﬀers
returns a constant that is statistically indistinguishable from zero and a slope coeﬃcient that
is highly signiﬁcant and statistically indistinguishable from one.
Figure 8. Predictions versus Data for Ultimatum Game Oﬀers
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The relationship between DG and UG oﬀers can also be explored at the subject level as, in all
but one society, the same subjects played as Player 1s in both the DG and the UG. Table 8
presents three subject-ﬁxed-eﬀects (within) regressions of oﬀers made in the DG and UG.
The dependent variable in each regression is the size of the oﬀer made; the only explanatory
variable is a dummy indicating that the oﬀer was made in the UG rather than the DG. In
Column 1, the analysis is conducted for the full sample of DG and UG oﬀers.16 In Columns 2
and 3, the sample is divided in accordance with Figure 5: in Column 2 the sample is restricted
to DG and UG oﬀers made by individuals oﬀering 0.2 or more in the DG; and in Column 3
15To establish that there is suﬃcient cross-society variation in behaviour to support such an analysis, a
subject-level regression taking UG oﬀers as the dependent variable was added to the set of regressions
described in Footnote 14 above. This regression was highly signiﬁcant and is reported in Table 7.
16The oﬀers made in Rural Missouri are excluded for the reason given in Footnote 3.22
the sample is restricted to DG and UG oﬀers made by individuals oﬀering zero or 0.1 in
the DG. The small, positive, signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on the UG indicator in Column 1 reveals
that, on average, subjects oﬀered more in the UG compared to the DG. The insigniﬁcance
of the corresponding coeﬃcient in Column 2 and the markedly larger, positive, and highly
signiﬁcant corresponding coeﬃcient in Column 3 reveal that the average increase in oﬀers
between the DG and the UG is driven by increases at the far left of the distribution, i.e., by
subjects who oﬀered zero or 0.1 in the DG. Like the society-level analysis, this subject-level
analysis both accords with Prediction 3 and explains why, in Figure 8, many of the data
points appear marginally above and to the left of the predicted relationship.
Table 8. Regression Analysis of Oﬀers in DG and UG
123
All If xDG > 0.1I f xDG ≤ 0.1
Coeﬀ. s.e. Coeﬀ. s.e. Coeﬀ. s.e.
Constant 0.365 0.007∗∗∗ 0.420 0.007∗∗∗ 0.058 0.017∗∗∗
UG 0.024 0.011∗∗ -0.013 0.010 0.229 0.025∗∗∗
Obs. 848 723 125
R2 0.013 0.001 0.444
Note. All estimates relate to subject-ﬁxed-eﬀects (within) re-
gressions for DG and UG oﬀers only. Oﬀer size is the dependent
variable. UG = 1 if oﬀer was made in Ultimatum Game. So, the
constant reports the mean Dictator Game oﬀer for supporting
sample. ∗ = 10%, ∗∗ = 5%, and ∗∗∗= 1% signiﬁcance.
6.4. DG Oﬀers and TPG Fining Strategies. If the society mean minimum unﬁned oﬀers
are plotted against society mean DG oﬀers and the resulting scatter superimposed on the
graph relating to Prediction 4 above, Figure 9 is returned.
17 The relationship between mean
DG oﬀers and TPG minimum unﬁned oﬀers appears positive but is not quite signiﬁcant
at the 10 percent level (the p-value associated with the na¨ ıve pairwise correlation is 0.117).
However, if the two highest data points in the graph (the Gusii and the Maragoli) are
excluded, a positive relationship that is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level is found across
the remaining eleven societies. This relationship appears to be below and to the right of
the predicted line. However, bootstrap tests of the form described above indicate that the
predicted relationship is rejected only for the Gusii, for whom the data point is above and
to the left of the line.
6.5. DG and TPG Oﬀers. If society mean TPG oﬀers are plotted against society mean
DG oﬀers and the resulting scatters superimposed on the graph relating to Prediction 5,
17To establish that there is suﬃcient cross-society variation in behaviour to support such an analysis, a
subject-level regression with TPG minimum unﬁned oﬀers as dependent variable was added to the set of
regressions described in Footnote 14 above. This regression was highly signiﬁcant and is reported in Table 7.23
Figure 9. Fining in the Third-Party Punishment Game
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Figure 10 is returned.18 The relationship between mean DG and TPG oﬀers is positive and
signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level and, according to bootstrap tests of the form described
above, the predicted relationship cannot be rejected for any society.
Figure 10. Oﬀers in the Third-Party Punishment Game
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Finally, while it is not possible to incorporate TPG oﬀers into a subject-ﬁxed-eﬀects regres-
sion analysis, it is possible to conduct a pooled, cross-section regression analysis of all the
oﬀers made in all three games. Table 9 presents two such regressions. In Column 1, oﬀers,
pooled across all three games, are regressed on two variables, one indicating that the oﬀer
was made in the UG and the other indicating that the oﬀer was made in the TPG. (Oﬀers
18To establish that there is suﬃcient cross-society variation in behaviour to support such an analysis, a
subject-level regression taking TPG oﬀers as the dependent variable was added to the set of regressions
described in Footnote 14 above. This regression was highly signiﬁcant and is reported in Table 7.24
Table 9. Regression Analysis of Oﬀers in DG, UG, and TPG
12
Coeﬀ. s.e. Coeﬀ. s.e.
Constant 0.365 0.015∗∗∗ 0.374 0.022∗∗∗
UG 0.025 0.013∗ 0.022 0.012∗
TPG -0.048 0.020∗∗ -0.062 0.015∗∗∗














Rural Missouri 0.067 0.027∗∗
Obs. 1212 1212
R2 0.026 0.130
Note. Standard errors adjusted to account for non-indep-
endence within sessions; ∗ = 10%, ∗∗ =5 % ,∗∗∗ =1 %
signiﬁcance. Oﬀer size is the dependent variable.
made in the DG are, once again, the basis for comparison.) Then, in Column 2, the number
of subjects present at the session in which the oﬀer was made and fourteen dummy variables
indicating which society the subject making the oﬀer came from (Accra is the basis for com-
parison) are included as additional explanatory variables. In both regressions, the standard
errors relating to the estimated coeﬃcients are adjusted to account for non-independence
within sessions by clustering.
The UG indicator coeﬃcients in both regressions are consistent with the subject-ﬁxed-eﬀects
analysis. The TPG indicator coeﬃcient is negative, two to three times larger, highly signif-
icant, and consistent with the prediction.
19
Finally, like all of the regressions presented in Table 7, the regression in Column 2 of Table 9
provides evidence of signiﬁcant variations in behaviour across societies. The Hadza, Tsimane,
Gusii, and Samburu all oﬀer signiﬁcantly less than Accrans; the Sanquianga and Rural
Missourians oﬀer signiﬁcantly more.
20
19Clustering by individual subject or by society returns almost indistinguishable results. Within subject
random-eﬀect regressions return slightly smaller coeﬃcients on the TPG game indicator: 0.038 and 0.057 in
the models with and without session size and society indicators respectively. Tobit estimations that account
for the truncation of oﬀers at zero and one return slightly larger coeﬃcients on the TPG game indicator:
0.043 and 0.066 in the models with and without session size and society indicators respectively.
20The society indicators are jointly signiﬁcant at the 0.005 percent level. Out of the 92 possible pairwise
comparisons of coeﬃcients on society indicators, 42 indicate signiﬁcant diﬀerences between societies at the 125
7. Departures from the Theory
The ﬁndings in the previous section indicate that, in general, the simple theoretical model
presented above explains the experimental data very well. However, there are several note-
worthy points of divergence: the incidence of ﬁning in the TPG is too high to be explicable
by error alone; minimum acceptable oﬀers diverge signiﬁcantly from the theoretical predic-
tion in three societies (too high in one, the Gusii, and too low in two) and appear low in
most; the minimum unﬁned oﬀer is signiﬁcantly higher than predicted in one society (the
Gusii) but appears low in most; and the high UG oﬀers among the Sursurunga, high TPG
oﬀers among the Maragoli, the rejection of oﬀers of 0.5 in the UG among the Hadza and
the Sursurunga, the correspondingly high incidences of rejection in those two societies, and
the high incidence of rejection coupled with the reduction in oﬀers between the DG and UG
among the Maragoli are all causes for concern.
7.1. The Incidence of Fining and Rejecting. Prediction 1 states that TPG oﬀers should
never be ﬁned in equilibrium. However, signiﬁcant ﬁning is seen in the data. Fining would
occur in equilibrium if the cost of ﬁning to Players 1 and 3 were lower. However, given the
values used in the experiments and the utility function in (1), equilibrium ﬁning should not
be observed.
Equilibrium ﬁning would also be predicted if players in diﬀerent roles assigned and were
assigned diﬀerent weights wij, such that the utility function took the form
u
 










j=1 wij = 1. (The model presented in Section 4, arbitrarily, sets wij = 1
n for all i
and j.) Now, if Player 3 places high weights on the inequality between Players 1 and 2 (and
α is high enough so that ﬁning is optimal even for large oﬀers), while Player 1 places low
weights on the inequality between Players 1 and 2 (and α is not too high, so that a ﬁned
zero oﬀer yields higher utility than any unﬁned oﬀer), ﬁning would occur in equilibrium.
For example, if Player 1 has (extreme) weights such that w13 ≈ 1, and Player 3 has weights
w31 = w32 = 1
2, then α = 3 is large enough to guarantee ﬁnes in equilibrium. However, if α
is very large, Player 1 is too inequality averse for ﬁning to remain an equilibrium.
The alternative utility function u 
i does not alter the prediction that Player 2 in the UG never
rejects an equilibrium oﬀer. The reason is that rejection in the UG results in zero payoﬀs for
both players;21 in the TPG, however, positive payoﬀs accrue even in the presence of a ﬁne.
percent level, an additional 6 indicate signiﬁcant diﬀerences at the 5 percent level, and a further 6 indicate
signiﬁcant diﬀerences at the 10 percent level.
21An oﬀer of x = 1
2, followed by Player 2’s acceptance, yields a payoﬀ strictly greater than zero (in fact,
u 
i = 1
2) to both players regardless of the weights (or α). Therefore, in the subgame following such an oﬀer
Player 2 must, in equilibrium, accept. Such an oﬀer is always available to Player 1, so it can never be
subgame perfect for Player 1 to have an oﬀer rejected, and thus receive zero (although it may be Nash).26
An alternative, and less ad hoc, approach would be to model uncertainty explicitly to take
account of apparent variations in α within societies. For instance, and returning to the utility
function in (1), assume that each player’s α is drawn from some (society-speciﬁc) distribution.
Such a model would generate equilibria in which there were non-zero probabilities of ﬁning
in the TPG and of rejection in the UG.
7.2. Minimum Acceptable and Minimum Unﬁned Oﬀers. In the UG, minimum ac-
ceptable oﬀers are signiﬁcantly lower than predicted in two societies and appear lower than
predicted in most others; minimum unﬁned oﬀers in the TPG also appear low. Further, the
society mean minimum acceptable oﬀers are highly correlated with society mean minimum
unﬁned oﬀers, suggesting that whatever mechanism is driving the former away from the
prediction is doing the same to the latter.22 Given the application of the strategy method
in both cases, the mechanism cannot be related to uncertainty.23 A preference for eﬃciency
could explain the lower-than-predicted rejecting and ﬁning. However, it cannot explain the
signiﬁcant and notable exception: among the Gusii both the mean minimum acceptable of-
fer and the mean minimum unﬁned oﬀer are signiﬁcantly greater than predicted. It seems
unlikely that the Gusii have a preference for ineﬃciency! An alternative explanation is that
a preference relating to acts of vengeance is at work, with most societies sharing a preference
against vengeance and the Gusii displaying a preference in favour of vengeance.24
7.3. The Sursurunga, the Hadza, and the Maragoli. Among the Sursurunga, eight
people rejected UG oﬀers of 0.5. The strategies chosen by two displayed multiple incon-
sistencies, suggesting that they did not understand the task. The remaining six indicated
minimum acceptable oﬀers in excess of 0.5, with four indicating a minimum acceptable oﬀer
of 1.0 and stating after the experiment that they wanted “all or nothing”. These strategies
and post-play statements do not accord with the theoretical model presented above. How-
ever, they are consistent with the subjects’ reputations within their community as diﬃcult
individuals who, if crossed, may retaliate with sorcery. Further, they are consistent with
the subjects treating the experiment as an opportunity to bolster reputations as hard and
ruthless bargainers and, in turn, with costly signalling (Spence, 1973, 1974) and, possibly,
the “madman” theory attributed to Schelling (1960). That play was anonymous weakens
this argument, although players were always at liberty to tell others what they had done in
the game afterwards and, in this case, their stories may have been corroborated by Player
1s who oﬀered 0.5 and had those oﬀers rejected.25
22Note also that the mechanism does not appear to aﬀect maximum acceptable oﬀers, possibly because these
relate to oﬀer levels that the Player 2s do not expect to see.
23Using the ﬁrst-round data, Henrich et. al. (2005) explored uncertainty’s role in determining UG oﬀers.
24A preference against vengeance is known to exist among the Yasawa. However, at the current time, there
is no data relating to the other societies.
25Reputation maintenance oﬀers a complementary explanation for some of the features of the data that are
consistent with the theory. After participating in the experiments, several Shuar subjects indicated that
they had acted in a manner that, they hoped, would convey an image of the Shuar as fair-minded people.27
Among the Hadza, ﬁve people rejected UG oﬀers of 0.5. Two of these accepted all oﬀers
greater than 0.5, suggesting that the rejection of 0.5 may have been a mistake. However,
the strategies for the remaining three are monotonic and indicate minimum acceptable oﬀers
of 0.7 in the case of two and 0.9 in the case of one. Though not as marked as the four
Sursurungan strategies described above, these Hadza strategies may also be a result of costly
signalling. The Hadza are known to be hard bargainers both among themselves when sharing
meat from hunted prey and with outsiders.
The high incidence of rejection in the UG among the Maragoli is not owing to rejections
of oﬀers of 0.5. Rather, it is the result of a mismatch between UG oﬀers and rejection
strategies; low oﬀers are often rejected, but this appears not to have been anticipated by
the Player 1s, who often make low oﬀers. To some extent this reﬂects an unpredicted fall in
oﬀers between the DG and the UG. While this fall is not suﬃcient to push the society means
oﬀ the predicted relationship or to show up in the subject-ﬁxed-eﬀects analysis of DG and
UG oﬀers pooled across all sites, a subject-ﬁxed-eﬀects analysis of DG and UG oﬀers among
the Maragoli indicates that the fall in oﬀers between the two games is signiﬁcant at the 10
percent level. Further analysis indicates that the Maragoli who reduced their oﬀers between
the two games were relatively poor and had made relatively high oﬀers in the DG. However,
if the reductions in oﬀers were adjustments aimed at compensating for overly generous DG
oﬀers, they were badly judged: most of these Player 1s earned nothing from the UG as a
result of their actions. The researcher who conducted the experiments with the Maragoli
reports that the sessions were very long and that, by the time the UG was played, some
subjects were angry. Maybe this anger led to impaired judgement.
Another factor contributing to the Marigoli’s high rejection incidence in the UG may be the
recent shocks they have suﬀered: AIDS has taken a heavy toll leaving almost 30 percent of the
sampled population widowed and the year preceding the experiments was marked by a severe
drought. It is quite plausible that, therefore, this society is in behavioural disequilibrium.
7.4. High Oﬀers. Given the care taken to ensure that the subjects understood the decisions
they were being asked to make, the incidence of oﬀers greater than 0.5 is high. However,
like the high minimum acceptable oﬀers described above, these too may be explicable with
reference to a meta-game. It could be that these individuals were choosing to make high
oﬀers so that, after the experiments, they could describe their actions and thereby boost
their reputations as generous individuals.
8. Conclusion
This paper ﬁrst presented and then analysed a dataset relating to three bargaining games
played under controlled conditions in ﬁfteen societies. The behavioural data generated by
these games varied markedly across societies. The focus of the analysis was to investigate
whether and to what extent these variations could be explained by diﬀerences along a single28
dimension, namely the value placed on equality. Combining a simple, well-behaved utility
function containing a single preference parameter capturing the notion of inequality aversion
with that of subgame perfection, several predictions were generated. In general, the data
accorded with these predictions thereby providing support for the overarching hypothesis
that, within the context of the DG, UG, and TPG, inequality aversion is the principle
motivating factor and variations in behaviour across societies and across individuals within
societies do, in large part, result from diﬀerences in the value placed upon equality.
Despite the overall success of the model, it failed in a number of telling regards. First, a pref-
erence other than inequality aversion appears to have a bearing on the rejection and ﬁning
of inequitable behaviour and, as both a preference for eﬃciency and an aversion to uncer-
tainty can be ruled out, a preference for or against vengeful acts is the most likely candidate.
Second, in two societies some of the experimental subjects appear to have used the games
as an opportunity to signal, at a cost to themselves and others, their bargaining prowess.
Finally, in almost all societies the incidence of ﬁning in the TPG is signiﬁcantly greater than
zero, indicating that a model in which players are uncertain about the preferences of their
playing partners may do better than the one presented here.
In conclusion, while the data repeatedly indicate that the value placed on equality varies
widely across societies, it appears to be greater than zero in all. At least within the context
of simple bargaining games, homo sapiens might reasonably be described as homo æqualis.
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